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Abstract
Pressure on health care systems due to the increasing expenditures of
the elderly population is pushing policy makers to adopt new regulation and
payment schemes for nursing home services. We consider the behavior of
nonprot nursing homes under di¤erent payment schemes and empirically
investigate the implications of prospective payments on nursing home costs
under tightly regulated quality aspects. To evaluate the impact of the policy
change introduced in 2006 in Southern Switzerland - from retrospective to
prospective payment - we use a panel of 41 homes observed over a 10-years
period (2001-2010). We employ a xed e¤ects model with a time trend that
is allowed to change after the policy reform. There is evidence that the new
payment system slightly reduces costs without impacting quality.
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1 Introduction
Increasing health care expenditures for the elderly population is a major con-
cern for society and policymakers. In Europe, the percentage of people over 64
rose rapidly in the past decades and is expected to increase between two and
six times by 2060, ranging from 22-25% in Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, and the
United Kingdom, to 33-36% in Bulgaria, Germany, Latvia, Poland, Romania,
and Slovakia (Eurostat, 2012; European Union, 2012). Accordingly, the demand
of nursing home care is expected to increase rapidly raising the burden on pub-
lic resources generally used to cover nursing home costs or to subsidize prices of
nursing home services (Karlsson et al., 2006).
In the past 30 years hopes have been pinned on the possibility to control
healthcare expenditures by replacing Retrospective (RPS) with Prospective Pay-
ment Systems (PPS), mainly in the hospital sector. Under PPS, a predetermined,
xed amount of resources is paid for the service. The rationale is that reimburse-
ment based on ex-ante costs prevents health care providers from giving unneces-
sary care (Jegers et al., 2002). In the U.S., the use of PPS has been extended from
hospitals to the nursing home sector in 1997 through the Balanced Budget Act.
Similarly, many European countries have recently incorporated more incentivizing
payment systems into their existing funding systems.
Although the health economics literature is rich of studies on the impact of
PPS in the U.S. nursing home sector (e.g. Chen and Shea, 2002; Norton, 1992;
Zhang et al., 2008), there is little empirical evidence in Europe. A number of
studies have been published on the impact of PPS in the hospital sector in di¤erent
European countries, for instance Finland (Linna, 2000), Norway (Biorn et al.,
2006), and Portugal (Dismuke and Sena, 1999). To our knowledge, the only study
on the impact of PPS to nance nursing home services is the recent analysis
by Dormont and Martin (2012) based on a hypothetical scenario. The authors
investigate the costs-e¢ ciency trade-o¤ in French nursing homes (NHs) to predict
possible implications of a switch in the payment system.
In this paper, we provide evidence on the impact of PPS on the costs of a
sample of NHs operating in one Swiss canton (Ticino) by exploiting data before
and after the introduction of PPS. Switzerland is a federal state in which the
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provision and regulation of nursing home care for elderly people is organized at
the regional level (cantons). As consequence, institutional and organizational
aspects of nursing home care vary across the 26 cantons. In 2006, the cantonal
authority in Ticino substituted the previously-in-force payment system based on
acknowledged nancial needs (RPS) with an ex-ante determined budget (PPS).
To evaluate the impact of this policy change we use an econometric model with
xed-e¤ects (FE) with a time trend that is allowed to change after the policy
reform. We will provide evidence that the new payment system reduced costs
growth for NH care, after controlling for the quality of services.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an
overview of recent studies analyzing the impact of PPS on costs, quality and
access to health care services. Section 3 describes the regulatory reform and the
potential e¤ects of the new payment system. Data and identication strategy for
the policy change are discussed in section 4. The econometric estimations are
presented in section 5, and section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Previous research on the impact of PPS in nursing
home care
The empirical evidence regarding the impact of PPS on costs, quality and access
in NH care is not conclusive. The literature mostly relies on studies conducted
during the 90s in the U.S. where PPS were rstly introduced. Some of these
studies focus on the nancial consequences of PPS by looking at changes in costs
(e.g. Ohsfeldt et al., 1991; Sexton et al., 1989). More recently, attention has been
devoted to the understanding of cost reduction achievements. Improved methods
to control for changes in quality and to cope with the potential endogeneity of
output and/or quality in cost functions have been proposed (Gertler and Wald-
man, 1992; Chen and Shea, 2002). Also, direct assessment of the impact of PPS
on quality (Konetzka et al., 2004; Konetzka et al., 2006) and access to nursing
care (Coburn et al., 1993) have been carried out.
Regarding the e¤ects on costs, Sexton et al. (1989) use a two steps strategy to
regress e¢ ciency scores calculated using Data Envelopment Analysis on changes in
the payment system occurred in the State of Maine in 1982. They nd a decrease
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in technical e¢ ciency. Quality variations are assumed to be negligible. Ohsfeldt
et al. (1991) exploit variations in the payment systems of 47 U.S. states over a
12-years period using a random e¤ects model. After correcting for endogeneity in
the reimbursement system by means of instrumental variables, the authors nd a
reduction of 20 per cent in per diem costs due to PPS.
Coburn et al. (1993) extend the traditional cost analysis by looking at the
consequences of PPS on quality and access for Medicaid patients in the State
of Maine. The analysis shows that PPS reduces growth in per-patient variable
costs. During the rst three years after the introduction of PPS, the average
savings and losses per patient day decreased substantially. Afterward, the authors
observed a remarkable increase in the number of NHs experiencing losses. Only the
percentage of room and board costs relative to the total variable costs decreased
over time, suggesting that cost savings were not achieved through reductions in
quality. Finally, the percentage of Medicaid patients decreased, which can be
interpreted as a negative impact on access for most severe patients.
Concerns about the evidence obtained during the 90s are raised by Chen and
Shea (2002), who question the methodology used. In particular, they point at the
inadequate measures of quality and output/quality endogeneity in cost functions.
To cope with the endogeneity issue, the authors construct instrumental variables
for both output and quality, and investigate the impact of PPS on short-term
operating costs. The analysis is performed on a one-year data set of di¤erent U.S.
states grouped into three di¤erent payment systems. The authors show that NHs
with PPS are no longer signicantly cheaper than facilities subject to cost-based
retrospective payments, after controlling for quality di¤erences.
More recently Zhang et al. (2008) assessed the impact of PPS on the cost
e¢ ciency of 8361 NHs in the U.S. over the period 1997-2003. During this period,
three major policy changes occurred. In 1997, the Balance Budget Act (BBA)
ratied the introduction of PPS. Afterward, the Balanced Budget Renement Act
(BBRA, 2000) and the Benet Improvement and Protection Act (BIPA, 2001) in-
creased the baseline payments in consequence of the nancial di¢ culties reported
by NHs. DEA calculated e¢ ciency scores are regressed on policy change variables
identied with time markers and a truncated random e¤ect model is applied. The
results show a negative relationship of all policy change variables with e¢ ciency
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scores. The authors capture quality di¤erences by weighting the output with a
score calculated using the number of deciency citations.
To our knowledge, only Crivelli et al. (2002) consider the relationship between
costs and nancing mechanisms using data from Switzerland in year 2008. The
authors do not nd any signicant impact of di¤erent payment systems on the
e¢ ciency of NHs. The main limitation of this study is that di¤erent nursing home
care systems exist which are hardly comparable. The cross sectional setting of the
study does not allow to control for unobserved characteristics of the 26 systems.
A growing strand of literature investigates the impact of PPS on quality
aspects of nursing home care. Using data on U.S. NHs over the period 1996-
2000, Konetzka et al. (2004) study the impact of PPS on quality by applying a
di¤erence-in-di¤erence approach and a negative binomial model. The authors use
changes in the professional sta¢ ng and the number of regulatory deciencies as
proxies for quality. As expected, PPS is found to signicantly reduce the profes-
sional sta¤. The negative impact of PPS is partially corrected by the introduction
of the Balanced Budget Renement Act. As with respect to regulatory decien-
cies, only weak evidence is reported. Also, no di¤erences between for-prot and
nonprot NHs are found.
Finally, Konetzka et al. (2006) investigate the spillover e¤ects of introduc-
ing PPS in Medicare residents on quality for Medicaid patients. Since facilities
cross-subsidize part of the costs of Medicaid residents with the higher margins
of Medicare and high private-pay residents, the cuts in revenue due to the in-
troduction of PPS may also have a¤ected quality of long-stay residents. Using a
quasi-experimental approach in four U.S. states over the period 1995-2000, the au-
thors show that PPS has an adverse e¤ect on urinary tract infections and pressure
scores.
To conclude, the literature remains inconclusive as with respect to the impact
of PPS in nursing home care. Also, it is worth pointing out that most of the studies
mentioned are conducted in the U.S. where private for-prot facilities represent a
large share of total NHs and the environment is increasingly competitive. It is not
clear whether this leads to di¤erent behavioral responses as compared to nonprot
institutions, which are largely present in Europe. In competitive environments,
the expected negative impact of cost reductions on quality may be mitigated by
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the need to maintain a high reputation. As suggested by Grabowski and Town
(2011), NHs facing greater competition are more responsive to quality improving
projects. However, competition can also have a negative e¤ect on quality if it
pushes prices down (Forder and Allan, 2012). Conversely, in a non-competitive,
nonprot environment with highly regulated prices and quality, such as the Swiss
NH sector, the possible negative impact of cost reductions on quality is expected
to be limited.
3 The regulatory reform
In Ticino, nursing home care is provided primarily by regulated public and private
nonprot organizations. The provision of NH care is further decentralized at local
level (municipalities) and elderly people are commonly assigned to the NH in
the community of residence. Therefore, NHs operate as local monopolies with
virtually no competition. Price and quality are regulated by the authority, i.e.
the Regional Department of Public Health (RDPH). Prices are subsidized and
dened by the RDPH as a function of residentsincome (pension payments) and
wealth, and do not vary across NHs. Quality is regulated in many structural and
procedural aspects. Because of tight regulation the production process is highly
homogeneous.
In 2006, the authority in Ticino introduced global budgets for nursing home
care. Prior to the introduction of global budgets, subsidies to providers of long
term care were allocated by the authority based on acknowledged nancial needs.
Subsidies were dened at the end of the year as the actual costs incurred by the
NH minus the revenue obtained from residents fees. More precisely, the payment
system consisted of two parts: an ex ante dened component and an upward ad-
justment based on actual costs at the end of the year. The ex ante component was
an estimation of the costs for the following operative year based on a combination
of historical costs and benchmarking parameters at the sector level. At the end
of the year, more nancial resources to cover the decit were paid if the NH was
able to justify additional expenses. Conversely, service providers with year-end
costs below the initially estimated nancial need were not allowed to retain the
savings. In practice, the system was retrospective because additional expenses
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were generally recognized. The authority viewed this system as inationary and
poorly incentivizing. The low exibility of the system due to the detailed con-
trol over all cost items made it almost impossible for the management to make
decisions on the cost structure, and led to low responsibility as with respect to
budget decisions and nancial performance. The funding system had the adverse
incentive to spend the whole amount of resources provided.
In the early 2000s, to respond to the need of improving transparency and ef-
ciency in long term care, the RDPH modied the payment system. Subsidies
based on cost reimbursement were replaced by prospectively dened global bud-
gets. A pilot phase was lunched in January 2003. Five NHs were selected to
participate in the pilot phase over a three-years period. Information collected
during these years were used to dene the list of services provided, an analytical
accounting system, and a package of modern managerial tools. Since January
2006, the system has been applied to all NHs.
The current payment system net of resident fees is composed of two elements:
a standardized part and an individual component. The standardized part includes
four main service categories: residential, animation, care and therapies. This part
is calculated by multiplying standard costs for each service (also called prospec-
tive rates in the literature) by the expected volume of each service. Standard
costs stem from the analytical accounting register and reect median costs in the
nursing home industry classied into nine categories, according to size, to cap-
ture economies of scale. Also, standard costs are calculated to implicitly dene
the level of productive e¢ ciency and quality desired by the authority. Quantities
(days of residence) are given by the number of beds times the expected occupancy
level and number of days in a year. The individual component, that represents
a minor part of the global budget, mainly covers NH-specic extra costs such as
rents and expenses for education trainings.
The starting prospective rate was determined for the year 2005, while the
prospective payment rates for the following years were adjusted for inationary
changes of some cost items only (e.g. wages). An adjustment based on savings
achieved in the previous years is planned to occur on a medium-term perspective
depending on the nancial stability of the NHs and has not been applied yet.
The nal budget does not depend on the actual costs generated by the res-
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idents. NHs with end-year costs lower than the global budget are entitled to
retain a share (25%) of the savings. The main part (75%) are saved as mandatory
reserves to cover previous or future decits.
This new system is expected to ensure nancial stability of NH care providers
in the medium-term and to reduce average costs, through the change in the level
of cost sharing. The rich theoretical literature on provider behavior under dif-
ferent payment systems can help to understand the possible e¤ect of the policy
change on costs. There is strong evidence that providers respond to economic
incentives (McGuire, 2012). However, several authors suggest that a prospective
payment system placing full responsibility on nursing home care providers does
not represent a rst-best solution. Ellis and McGuire (1986) show that mixed
reimbursement systems, such as the one analyzed in this study, are superior to
fully prospective payments and cost reimbursement systems as they reduce risk
to providers and incentivize them to o¤er an e¢ cient level of services. Similarly,
Zweifel et al. (2009) identify the restrictive conditions under which full respon-
sibility of providers represent a rst-best solution. These include risk neutrality
of providers, symmetric information about residents severity, veriable quality
and known expected cost of treatment. An analogous conclusion is drawn by Ma
(1994): when patients can be refused or discriminated by quality, mixed payment
systems are desired. The new payment system in Ticino increases cost responsi-
bility without asking NHs to bear full nancial risk.
The net income of all NHs before the introduction of PPS was zero because all
NHs showed a decit that was covered by the authority. After the introduction
of PPS we observe: 1) a positive net income in the rst two years (2006-2007) for
the majority of NHs; 2) a lower positive net income in the last three years (2008-
2010), where approximately half of the NHs show a positive income and the other
half show a negative net income. The plausible explanation of this evolution is
that the introduction of PPS initially increased uncertainty over the availability of
nancial resources. Consequently, most NHs improved their e¤ort to reduce costs.
In the following years nancial resources remained unchanged and NHs adapted
to the new system, which reduced the level of positive net income on average.
A possible consequence of the new payment system is the negative impact
on quality of NH services. NHs may reduce costs by lowering quality since the
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demand for NH care does not reect quality (Chalkley and Malcomson, 1998) for
at least two reasons. First, patients may not be able to assess the multidimensional
nature of quality. Second, quality is partially an experience good and is observable
only after receiving care. Nevertheless, this e¤ect is unlikely given the existing
regulation of structural and procedural aspects of the production and provision
of nursing home care in Switzerland.
4 Empirical specication
4.1 The cost function
To empirically investigate the impact of global budget payments in nursing home
care, we exploit data from a natural experiment in Switzerland where the payment
system recently changed from RPS to PPS. We assume that NHs transform
three inputs - capital, labor and material - into a single output, measured by
the number of patient-days of nursing home care. Since the production process
is highly homogenous among NHs, the number of resident-days can represent a
good indicator of the level of production. Consequently, we specify a total costs
function which depends on output (Y ), price of labor, capital, and material (Pl,
Pk, Pm), some output characteristics (Q1,...,Qn), and a general time trend ():1 ;2
C = f(Y; Pk; Pl; Pm; Q1; :::; Qn; ). (1)
Total costs include capital, labour and material. The price of labor is calculated
as the weighted average wage of di¤erent professional categories employed in the
NH (doctors, nurses, administrative and technical sta¤).3 The amount of sta¤ as
well as the skill level are dened by the RDPH as a function of residentscase-mix.
1 In a non-competitive environment such as the Swiss one, there is no reason to assume that
NHs minimize costs. In this case, the cost function is a behavioral cost function (Evans, 1971)
and can still be used to make a comparison among rms. Moreover, by estimating a total cost
function instead of a variable cost function we avoid the risk related to a high correlation between
capital stock and output, which leads to a positive relationship between variable costs and capital
stock. A similar approach is used, for instance, by Farsi and Filippini (2004).
2 In order to estimate a cost function, either the output is assumed to be homogenous or we
need to control for service intensity and patientscharacteristics (Birnbaum et al., 1981).
3Unfortunately, labor prices for di¤erent labor categories cannot be used due to lacking data.
However, we should consider that for all NHs a collective labor agreement exists. Therefore, the
inclusion of several labor prices in the cost equation is expected to generate multicollinearity
problems.
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This rules out almost completely the possibility of increasing cost e¢ ciency by
hiring less professional nurses.4 The price of capital is calculated as the sum of
mortgage costs, amortization and costs related to capital purchases divided by
the capital stock, which is approximated by the number of beds. The price for
material is computed by taking the remaining costs and dividing them by the
number of meals provided each year. This item mainly includes costs for food
and residency. Other costs included are energy, water and administrative costs.
The rst characteristic of output, Q1, is the patient severity index which mea-
sures the average patients assistance by means of normal daily activities such as
eating, personal care or physiological activities. This index is based on an in-
strument called Paillard grid and measures the number of daily hours needed by
the patient for personal and medical care on average. The Paillard grid considers
12 categories of personal and medical care, such as preventive care, therapeutic
treatment, psychological status and mobility. Because of the relatively large num-
ber of categories, the patient severity index includes aspects that capture well the
need for professional services. The index is calculated on a yearly basis by the
authority. A value between 0 and 4 is assigned where higher values indicate more
severe cases.
The second characteristic of output, Q2, is the nursing sta¤ ratio, that is the
ratio between the number of nurses employed in a NH and the optimal number
of nurses that should be employed according to the guidelines of the authority.
Our measure di¤ers from quality indicators commonly used in the nursing home
literature as the theoretically optimal number of nurses is usually not calculated.
Because nursing home care is a labor-intensive service, the nursing sta¤ ratio can
be considered as a good indicator of quality (see for example Johnson-Pawlson
and Infeld, 1996; Schnelle et al., 2004). Labor costs represent the main costs of a
NH and make about 85 per cent of total costs. Consequently, a small change in
the nursing sta¤ ratio may a¤ect total costs considerably. The nursing sta¤ ratio
is, therefore, a key variable in our analysis since NHs with relatively high costs
may decide to decrease the number or quality of workers to save money. If this
4The monetary compensation of the sta¤ is also a function of age. Therefore, there exists the
possibility to reduce costs by hiring younger sta¤ members. Due to lack of data, we cannot rule
out this strategy.
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is the case, then the estimates could su¤er from endogeneity bias. To test the
endogeneity of this regressor, we perform the robust Durbin-Wu-Hausman test.5
U.S. studies have shown that the ratio of professional nurses to patient or to
total nursing sta¢ ng are the strongest predictors of quality. We then consider
additional measures of quality by separately including in the cost function the
nurse-to-patient ratio (Q3), the professional nurse-to-patient ratio (Q4) and the
ratio of professional to total nursing sta¤ (Q5). From equation (1) we nally derive
four model specications: a baseline model (Model 1) with one quality indicator
(Q2) and three extendedmodels (Models 2, 3 and 4) with two quality indicators
(Q2 and either Q3, Q4 or Q5). See section 4.2 for further details on these quality
indicators.
In order to impose as few restrictions as possible to (1), we adopt a exible
translog functional form approximated at the median value. Input prices and
total costs are divided by the material price in order to satisfy the homogeneity
condition in input prices.6 The translog approximation to (1) can be written as:
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where " is the error term. We check for the concavity condition in input prices
after the estimation.
5The test is robust to arbitrary violations of conditional homoskedasticity and clustering,
and consists in estimating the model by a Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator
and applying the Sargan statistic. We perform this test using the lagged value of Q2 as an
instrumental variable. The test statistic is 2 distributed with a robust score 2(1) = 0:55. The
null hypothesis of exogenous Q2 cannot be rejected at any standard level of signicance.
6The cost function is linear homogenous of degree 1 in input prices when a 10% increase in
all input prices leads to a 10% increase in total costs.
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4.2 Data and descriptive statistics
Our study builds on data extracted from annual reports delivered to the authority
by all regulated NHs scattered in canton Ticino. The initial data set contains
50 NHs observed over a 10-years period (2001   2010). This period includes
5 years before the implementation of the global budget and 5 years following its
adoption. From this initial sample, we exclude 5 NHs either because a considerable
share of their output (patient-days) is produced in foyers or because they show
unreasonable values for some variables of interest and are therefore dropped.7 ,8
Finally, we exclude the NHs selected for the pilot phase of global budget adoption
for three main reasons. First, the pilot phase was mainly intended to set down
the rules of the new payment system and to understand its functioning. Second,
pilot NHs are few and are observed for a too short period (3 years) to be used as
control group. Finally, these NHs were not randomly selected.9
The nal sample consists of an unbalanced panel of 41 NHs observed for 10
years (400 observations). The minimum number of observations per cluster is 7,
while on average information is available over the whole period (9:8 years). In
Table 1 we report some descriptive statistics of the characteristics of NHs, which
include the mean, the standard deviation, and the rst and third quartiles. On
average, NHs have 67 beds and provides services for 23735 resident days yearly,
each of which costs about CHF 248. The nursing sta¤ ratio is 0:95 indicating that,
on average, the personnel employed by NHs is close to the amount suggested by the
authority. On average there are 3 nurses per patient (Q3) and the large majority
of nurses (about 83%) are certied professional nurses (Q5). The average price of
labor is about CHF 82000 per year, while the price of capital is CHF 5771 per
bed and the price per meal is CHF 9:23.
A considerable variation is observed across NHs in almost all variables. The
7Foyers are external residential apartments where the healthiest patients get NH care. There-
fore, the production process of these NHs might di¤er a lot as compared to the others.
8These are private for-prot institutions that were placed under the authority control and
largely subsidized. This implied a change in the production process and hardly comparable data.
9 In Table 5 in the Appendix we show that pilot NHs are relatively cheaper than non pilot
NHs. Also, in Table 6 (see Appendix) we show that also the cost evolution over time di¤ers
between the two groups: pilot NHs experienced a more important cost increase before the pilot
phase, while from the introduction of the new payment system their costs decreased relative to
non pilot NHs.
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Variables Description Mean Std. Dev. 1st q. 3rd q.
AC Average cost per resident day 247.63 23.42 232.15 262.50
Y Total resident days per year 23735 8533 17595 27768
K Number of beds 67 24 50 80
Pl Average labor price 82051 4526 79456 85091
per employee per year
Pk Average capital price per bed 5771 2600 4103 7040
Pm Average material price per meal 9.23 4.92 8.15 9.74
Q1 Average dependency index 3.12 0.35 2.90 3.38
Q2 Nursing sta¤ ratio 0.95 0.08 0.90 0.98
Q3 Total nursing sta¤ to patient ratio 0.35 0.08 0.32 0.40
Q4 Professional nursing sta¤ 0.28 0.08 0.25 0.34
to patient ratio
Q5 Professional to total 0.83 0.12 0.77 0.92
nursing sta¤ ratio
Notes: All monetary values are in 2005 Swiss francs (CHF) adjusted by the national Consumer Price
Index.
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of costs, inputs and output characteristics over the
whole period.
average cost per resident day of the rst quartile is around CHF 232, and increases
to CHF 262 in the third quartile. The size of NHs also varies remarkably: three-
quarters of NHs provide less than 81 beds, and the biggest NH has 145 beds. This
sizable variation can be read also in the number of resident days.
As with respect to input prices, we recognize that variation in average costs
per employee is relatively small (around CHF 4500 per year), whereas average
price of capital in the third quartile is about 70% higher than in the rst quartile.
This heterogeneity in the price of capital is mainly due to di¤erences in deprecia-
tion policies, donations and/or capital structure. In addition, NHs vary in output
characteristics, i.e. the dependency index and the nursing sta¤ ratio. Note, how-
ever, that 50% of NHs have a nursing sta¤ ratio between 0:94 and 1. This is
because the authority allows NHs to deviate from the value of reference by 10%
only. Beyond this threshold, the RDPH intervenes to ask for an adjustment in the
number of employees. This tight regulation is also generally reected in the total
nurse to patient ratio (Q3) and in the professional nursing sta¤ to patient ratio
(Q4), which vary by less than 9 percentage points between the rst and the third
quartile. More variation is observed in the professional to total nursing sta¤ ratio
(Q5) where the di¤erence between the values of the rst and the third quartile is
about 15 percentage points.
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In Table 2 we provide some descriptive statistics for the variables of inter-
est, calculated separately for the period before the change in the payment system
(PRE) and the following period (POST). The fourth column species whether
the variable mean has increased (+) or decreased ( ). Finally, we report the
results of a t-test on the probability of equal means across the two periods. Since
cost savings can be achieved through a reduction in the number of sta¤, for the
nursing sta¤ ratio (Q2) as well as for the other quality indicators (Q3; Q4; Q5)
we test whether the mean value has decreased (one-sided t-test). The pre-post
Variables PRE POST Variation H0 p-value
(195 obs.) (205 obs.)
AC 244.67 250.46 + PRE = POST 0.013
Y 23153 24287 + PRE = POST 0.184
K 66.06 68.94 + PRE = POST 0.229
Pl 80763 83277 + PRE = POST 0.000
Pk 5364 6158 + PRE = POST 0.002
Pm 8.38 10.04 + PRE = POST 0.000
Q1 3.09 3.16 + PRE = POST 0.004
Q2 0.96 0.93   PRE > POST 0.000
Q3 0.35 0.34   PRE > POST 0.070
Q4 0.28 0.29 + PRE > POST 0.849
Q5 0.81 0.84 + PRE > POST 0.995
Notes: all monetary values are in 2005 Swiss francs (CHF) adjusted by the national Consumer Price
Index.
Table 2: Comparison of means (pre and post reform) for the main variables of
interest.
analysis shows a small but statistically signicant increase in average costs (AC),
from about CHF 245 per resident day to around CHF 250. The number of beds
and the number of resident days remained pretty constant. As for output char-
acteristics, the analysis shows that the dependency index has slightly increased
while the nursing sta¤ ratio decreased by 3 percentage points. The increase in
the dependency index may be due to the increasing demand of nursing home care
over time and the shift of less severe residents to home care services. As expected,
it shows that NHs did not respond to the change in the payment system by se-
lecting healthier patients. Conversely, NHs may have responded to the change in
the payment system by reducing the number of nurses per resident. Note that
the nurse-to-patient ratio (Q3) slightly decreased after the implementation of the
global budget although this drop is not mirrored in the professional nurse-to-
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patient ratio (Q4) and the ratio of professional to total nursing sta¤ (Q5). The
issue will be discussed in more detail in section 5.2.
4.3 Identication strategy
As pointed out by Blundell and Dias (2009), the choice of the most appropriate
policy evaluation method relies on the nature of the policy change, as well as the
research question and data availability. In our study, the policy change concerns
all NHs in the sample at the same time. For this reason we can just observe
the treated group before and after the policy change. Therefore, to measure the
impact of global budget payment we exploit the panel properties of the dataset.
The underlying idea is to use information on di¤erent points in time for the same
individual as own group of control (individual e¤ects). We use a panel data model
that controls for unobserved heterogeneity and includes a temporal dummy vari-
able to capture the impact of the policy change. This strategy assumes that no
other major event occurred over the period considered which a¤ected the produc-
tion costs of NHs. We are condent that, in our case, this assumption is not too
restrictive. Firstly, because the NH sector is highly regulated and no other policy
reforms have occurred in the same period. Secondly, the resulting homogenous
production process makes it relatively easy to compare NHs and reduces unob-
served heterogeneity to negligible levels.10 Consequently, time varying unobserved
factors are not expected to have remarkable e¤ects on the results. Finally, input
prices and costs have been deated with the Consumer Price Index (CPI). Hence,
reduction in costs due to the recent economic recession should not be confounded
with cost savings generated by the new payment system. The international eco-
nomic crisis a¤ected real GDP growth in Switzerland only in year 2009 and with
a negligible impact. Looking at the occupancy rate we note that the demand of
NH care remained constant over the entire period of the analysis.
We capture the impact of PPS on costs with a dummy variable equal to 1 for
the years 2006   2010, the period where the PPS was in force, in addition to a
general time trend capturing the impact of technical change on costs throughout
the whole period. This is the approach adopted in many policy evaluation studies
when the policy change a¤ects all rms/individuals at the same time (e.g. Hat-
10This is also conrmed by the similarity between xed e¤ects and random e¤ects estimates.
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ton, 2005; Nakahara et al., 2010; Narayana and Pengb, 2006; Rotte and Vogler,
1999).11
When adopting this identication strategy, particular attention needs to be
devoted to the specication of the time trend. In fact, a mispecied time trend
may partially capture the impact of the policy change. Hence, to explore the
pattern of NH care costs over time, we estimate a cost model where we replace
the time trend with time dummies and drop the policy change dummy. The base
year is 2001. The estimated coe¢ cients for time dummies show that from 2001
to 2005 total costs increase linearly. Afterward, i.e. during the the introduction
of PPS, total costs remain pretty constant. This pattern suggests modelling the
time trend with a linear function.12
Assume the following general specication of the dummy variable in the total
costs function in (2):
ln

Cit
Pkit

= i +X
T
it T + dD + tt+ tdtD + vit, (3)
where XTit is the vector of explanatory variables, D is the dummy that assumes
value equal to 1 in the period of policy implementation (2006   2010), and 0
otherwise, and the error component " has been splitted into an individual e¤ect
i and a stochastic error term vit.
The impact of the policy reform can now be measured in two ways, depending
on how the dummy variable is allowed to enter the cost function. By imposing
td = 0, we restrict the attention to policy changes that a¤ect only the constant
term of the total cost function. In this case, dummy variable shifts are interpreted
as the average impact of PPS on costs during the whole period 2006   2010.
Alternatively, if we allow td 6= 0, the impact of PPS can change over time, and
additional information can be provided on the rate of costs increase. We refer
to these two time trend specications as the restricted xed-e¤ects model and
the unrestricted model.13 These will be estimated and compared in the following
11Remind that the pilot group cannot be used to apply a DID approach for three main reasons.
First, treatment was not randomly assigned. Second, the treated group (pilot NHs) includes only
few observations. Finally, the pilot phase was used to set up the new payment system and some
rules changed afterwards.
12A di¤erent specication of the time trend shows that the inclusion of a squared term leads
to overspecication and does not allow us to identify the impact of the policy change.
13A battery of specication tests was also performed. First, we checked whether the reform
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section. Since the cost model is in log-log form, the estimated coe¢ cient of the
policy dummy variable is interpreted as percentage change in total costs for small
values of the coe¢ cients, and semi-elasticity for higher values.
By identifying the policy change with a time dummy, we implicitly assume
that in the absence of reform, total costs in the period 2006   2010 would have
increased at the same rate as in the period 2001   2005. As stated above, to
control for changes in costs related to variations in the economic cycle, we adjust
cost and input prices for the CPI.14
5 Econometric estimation and results
5.1 Estimation approach
In order to choose the most adequate panel data model, we perform a series of
tests on our NHs dataset. Since the likelihood ratio test rejects the null hypothesis
of homoskedasticity (2(40) = 149:84, p-value = 0:000), heteroskedasticity-robust
tests and estimation methods are considered. We examine the xed-e¤ect model
(FE), the random e¤ect model (RE), and the rst di¤erence model (FD) discussed
in Nichols (2007) to create the counterfactual using observations on the same unit
over time. These methods remove the bias due to unobserved characteristics that
remain constant over time by adding individual-specic e¤ects. Nevertheless, it is
still necessary to control for the panel structure of the dataset, namely for errors
correlated within groups (Cameron and Miller, 2010). If part of the bias is due to
unobservable time-varying factors, our results may still be biased.
a¤ected other coe¢ cients by building interaction terms of each explanatory variable with the
policy dummy (D) and did not nd signicant evidence. An alternative approach would consist
of estimating two di¤erent models, one before the reform and one after the reform, and compare
the estimated coe¢ cients. However, this strategy allows individual e¤ects to di¤er between the
two periods, which is not desirable. Finally, we used a stochastic frontier approach to estimate
several models, such as the pooled frontier with Mundlak correction (Farsi at al., 2005) and
the true random e¤ect model. The impact of the reform was analyzed in two ways: rst, we
introduced the policy dummy into the deterministic part of the frontier, and second, we compared
the calculated mean ine¢ ciencies using the non parameteric Kruskal-Wallis test. All the model
specications and approaches used conrm the evidence that the new payment system reduced
total costs.
14According to the cantonal law (RL 2.5.4.5 ), salaries and indemnities for public employees
are adjusted using the national Consumer Price Index. Since labor costs represent the largest
proportion of total costs (up to 81%), to deate total costs and input prices seems an appropriate
choice.
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The di¤erence between the FE estimator and the FD estimator consists mainly
in the underlying assumption about the speed at which the policy reform a¤ects
the outcome. The FE estimates compare the mean outcome before the policy
reform with the mean outcome in the period after the reform. Instead, the FD
model assumes that the reform has a one-shot e¤ect at the moment of its intro-
duction. Therefore, the impact is fully captured by a jump in outcome in the
year 2006. We rule out the FD model for two reasons. First, from a policy point
of view the relevant question is what are the implications of the new payment
system in the medium term. Second, the introduction of PPS involves a series of
changes that need time to be understood, implemented and optimized.
Both the FE and the RE models include individual-specic e¤ects that al-
low to control for any constant unobserved heterogeneity, but they di¤er in the
way they consider these e¤ects. The FE model treats the individual-e¤ects as
xed parameters and allows them to be partially correlated with regressors, ac-
commodating a limited form of endogeneity (Cameron and Trivedi, 2010). In a
policy evaluation study this property is of particular relevance. The su¢ cient
condition for consistency of the FE model is E[XTit ("it   "i)] = 0, i.e. the policy
variable is allowed to be correlated with the persistent component of the error
term - the unobserved heterogeneity - but not with deviations from the mean,
("it  "i) (Wooldridge, 2002). Three main requirements need to be satised when
a FE model is applied. First, to avoid the so called incidental parameters prob-
lem, the time length should increase with the number of rms included in the
sample. Second, the main variable of interest has to vary over time since the
FE precludes the estimation of time-invariant regressors. Third, the percentage
within variation of the variables of interest as with respect to the overall variation
should be large enough to avoid imprecise estimates (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005).
Instead, the RE model assumes that the unobservable individual e¤ects are ran-
dom variables distributed independently of the regressors, that is: i  (; 2)
and vit  (0; v2), and the coe¢ cients are estimated with the Generalized Least
Square (GLS) method. Therefore, no correlation between the individual e¤ects
and the error term is permitted. The main disadvantage of the RE model is
that the estimates are a¤ected by the heterogeneity bias when the exogeneity
assumption is not satised, and are, therefore, inconsistent.
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In order to choose between the FE and the RE models we perform the robust
version of the Hausman test using the articial regression approach originally
described in Arellano (1993).15 The null hypothesis of regressors uncorrelated
with the group specic e¤ects is rejected at the 99% level (F (20; 399) = 698:33,
p-value = 0:000). Also, the analysis of the within variation of each variable of
the cost function shows that the percentage within variation over total variation
is satisfactory for all variables of interest.
Standard errors are corrected using the cluster robust estimator based on
Stock and Watson (2006).16 The authors show that the cluster-robust estimator
is preferred in FE models if serial correlation is expected, and it is reasonable to
rely on asymptotic theory. In our sample, the number of clusters is satisfactory
in order to rely on asymptotic theory for accurate inference (Kézdi, 2004). Also,
each cluster contains a su¢ cient number of observations.17
5.2 Results
Through our regression analysis we are able to control for factors explaining vari-
ation in costs over time not related to changes in the payment system. As a
consequence, we disentangle the general increase in costs from the impact of pol-
icy change. In Table 3 we present the estimated coe¢ cients of the restricted and
unrestricted FE models with two output characteristics (Q1 and Q2) specied in
equation (3). In this baseline model (Model 1) we control for quality of NH care
by means of the ratio between the number of nurses and the optimal number of
nurses per patient (Q2). The number of observations (N) and the model t statis-
tic R2  within are also provided in the table. The models explain about 97% of
the variation in the data. We focus the discussion on the unrestricted FE model
15The standard Hausman test assumes that the RE model is e¢ cient. A comparison of the
clustered and non clustered standard errors show that this assumption is violated in our case.
When this is the case, the robust Hausman test should be used. This approach consists in re-
estimating the RE model augmented with the original regressors transformed into deviations
from the mean.
16When dealing with panel data, the assumption of independently and identically distributed
errors (iid) is mostly violated due to three main reasons: heteroskedasticity, within-cluster cor-
relation and serial correlation.
17Kezdi (2004) states that a sample of 50 clusters is close enough to innity for accurate
inference if the number of observations for cluster is not too small. A cluster is considered small
if it contains less than ve observations per cluster (Rogers, 1994).
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Estimated coe¢ cients Restricted FE Std. Err. Unrestricted FE Std. Err.
Y 0.889 0.049 0.877 0.045
Pl 0.727
 0.023 0.749 0.021
Pk 0.099
 0.008 0.094 0.007
Q1 0.228
 0.040 0.239 0.038
Q2 0.395
 0.034 0.496 0.037
Y Y 0.474 0.099 0.432 0.092
PlPl -0.112 0.070 -0.067 0.067
PkPk 0.095
 0.019 0.108 0.020
Q1Q1 0.307
 0.060 0.226 0.059
Q2Q2 0.504 0.351 0.329 0.354
Y Pl 0.099
 0.048 0.084 0.045
Y Pk 0.016 0.026 0.016 0.024
Y Q1 -0.188 0.122 -0.053 0.110
Y Q2 0.257
 0.142 0.305 0.137
PlPk -0.051 0.036 -0.076
 0.032
PlQ1 0.345
 0.150 0.301 0.127
PlQ2 -0.351
 0.190 -0.121 0.264
PkQ1 -0.136
 0.057 -0.089 0.055
PkQ2 -0.056 0.068 -0.069 0.069
Q1Q2 -0.266 0.257 -0.121 0.264
t 0.008 0.001 0.018 0.002
d -0.012 0.006 0.090 0.022
td - - -0.018 0.003
0 15.457 0.008 15.423 0.009
N 400 400
R2 0.964 0.970
Notes: Signicance levels: * = 10%, ** = 5%, *** =1%, **** = 0:1%:
Table 3: Results of the restricted and unrestricted xed-e¤ects models with one
quality indicator (Model 1).
because it is more exible than the restricted model and the rst-order coe¢ cients
are similar in both specications. The output coe¢ cient (Y ) measures the total
costs elasticity with respect to output. A value lower than 1 suggests the presence
of unexploited economies of scale in the NH sector. In our case it indicates that
an increase by 10% in the number of resident-days would increase total costs by
about 8:88%.
The parameter estimates of output characteristics (Q1 and Q2) show a pos-
itive and highly-signicant value meaning that total costs increase with patients
severity and our quality indicator for the service provided, i.e. the nursing sta¤
ratio. These coe¢ cients can also be interpreted as cost elasticities. The case-mix
coe¢ cient (Q1) indicates that a 10% increase in patients severity increases costs
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by about 2%. More important, a 10% increase in the nursing sta¤ ratio (Q2)
leads to a total costs increase of 5%. The input price coe¢ cients (Pl and Pk)
are positive and signicant, meaning that the costs function is monotonically in-
creasing in the vector of input prices. These coe¢ cients provide information on
the percentage of labor and capital costs over total costs of a representative NH.
The estimated share of labor costs is around 73%, which is not far from the ac-
tual sample median (81%). Capital costs represent around 10% (sample median
is 6.2%) of total costs, while the costs of material account for about 17% (sample
median is 12%).
The estimated parameter (t) is highly signicant and indicates that, on av-
erage, total costs increase by 1:8% each year (0:8% in the restricted model). In-
creasing costs can be explained by increasing wages not associated to augmented
productivity (Baumol and William, 1966), the adoption of more costly technolo-
gies or new procedures implemented in the whole sector due to regulation. The
second-order coe¢ cients show the percentage variation in rst-order coe¢ cients in
response to a percentage variation in the regressors. We observe that the second-
order coe¢ cient of output (Y Y ) is statistically signicant, meaning that there is
some evidence of decreasing economies of scale. Total costs grow at increasing
rates with patients severity (Q1Q1) and capital price (PkPk).
Our main coe¢ cients of interest are those related to the impact of the reform.
In the restricted FE model, the impact of the policy change is captured by the
dummy variable coe¢ cient (d), which measures the average impact of PPS over
the whole period considered. As discussed above, costs increased by roughly
1% yearly from 2001. However, the negative and signicant coe¢ cient of the
policy dummy suggests that the reform reduced mean total costs by 1% from its
introduction in 2006. Concerning the unrestricted FE model, the impact of the
policy reform is allowed to vary in each year and is given by the combination
of changes in the intercept and slope coe¢ cients of the time trend (d and td).
The intercept of the time trend increases by 8:9%. However, the slope coe¢ cient
decreases by 1:8%. The e¤ect of the reform on costs in di¤erent years is given
by TC = 0:089  0:018(t  2000), where t  2006. The e¤ect is  0:02 in 2006,
 0:037 in 2007,  0:055 in 2008,  0:073 in 2009 and  0:091 in 2010. Hence, in
ve years the new payment system led to a reduction in costs of roughly 9%.
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It is worth noticing that we estimated the impact of the policy change after
controlling for quality, measured by the nursing sta¤ ratio. As shown in the
descriptive statistics, the nursing sta¤ ratio slightly decreased after the reform.
This may suggest that cost savings derived from the introduction of PPS were
obtained at some quality expenses. Though, the relationship between the nursing
sta¤ ratio and quality may not be straightforward. Although the number of nurses
has decreased, it might be that their productivity has increased to preserve the
quality of services provided to the residents. Improved managerial/organizational
practices induced by the reform and hardly measurable, for instance, may have
o¤set the small reduction in the nursing sta¤ ratio. We remind the reader that
the nursing sta¤ ratio is periodically controlled by the authority who forbids
NHs falling below a given threshold. Therefore, small reductions in Q2 could
be interpreted as positive, cost-reducing e¤ects of PPS.18 This may also explain
why our endogeneity test fails to reject the exogeneity hypothesis.
The above results were obtained controlling for the nursing sta¤ ratio dened
as the number of nurses over the theoretical optimal number of nurses. Con-
cerns arise as to whether the new payment system may generate cost savings
by substituting away more expensive professional nurses with less expensive non-
professional nurses at the expenses of the patient or by reducing the number of
nurses per patient. To further explore this issue, we report the estimates of three
extended models (Model 2, 3 and 4) where the nursing sta¤ ratio (Q2) is included
in the regression together with either the nurse-to-patient ratio (Q3), the profes-
sional nurse-to-patient ratio (Q4) or the ratio of professional to total nursing sta¤
(Q5). The results are summarized in Table 4 for the unrestricted model speci-
cation.19 The number of observations in Model 3 and Model 4 drop to 326 since
data for quality indicators Q4 and Q5 are limited. We note that the results of
the baseline model are generally conrmed. In particular, the policy coe¢ cients
are stable across all specications of quality. The impact of Q2 on costs is still
18We performed some sensitivity analysis. We included a dummy variable for the organizational
form. Although the coe¢ cient was statistically signicant, it did not a¤ect the estimates of the
policy dummy. We also performed the analysis without controlling for the nursing sta¤ ratio.
The estimated coe¢ cient of the dummy variable was larger, as expected. We then included Q2
in the cost function to provide more conservative estimates of the impact of PPS.
19Overall these results are conrmed in the restricted model specication.
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remarkable but more detailed nursing sta¤ ratios do not seem to generate signi-
cant e¤ects on costs. As mentioned above, we believe the tight cantonal regulation
on nursing sta¤ requirements did not provide much margins for signicant cost
savings through quality (nursing sta¤) adjustments.
6 Conclusions
Because of increasing healthcare costs and continuous pressure on public expen-
ditures to provide healthcare and residential services to the elderly population,
prospective payment systems may represent a promising way to enhance e¢ ciency
in nursing home care. Few empirical studies investigated the e¤ects of PPS in
nursing home care, mostly relying on U.S. data. Literature in the U.S. has shown
that PPS reduces overall costs to government but quality of care deteriorates as
well.
In 2006, Southern Switzerland introduced global budgets to nance NHs.
Through this paper we provided new evidence on the impact of PPS in the form of
global budgets on the performance of NHs. Among important di¤erences as with
respect to the NH sector in the U.S., our context is characterized by NH services
mainly provided by nonprot rms as local monopolies subject to tight quality
regulation by the authority in the form of number and type of nurses in relation
to residents need. We investigated the impact of PPS on the costs of providing
NH care using a panel data set of 41 NHs observed for a 10-years period from
2001 to 2010 controlling for quality aspects.
The analysis showed that the new payment system had a mild impact on costs
after controlling for quality aspects using di¤erent measures of the nursing sta¤
ratio. The new payment system reduced costs by about 9% after ve years of
policy implementation. This relatively small e¤ect could be explained by three
main reasons. First, as suggested by the theoretical literature, the real change in
the level of cost sharing between the old and the new payment systems was too
small to a¤ect providersincentives. Second, incentives to reduce costs were low
since NHs were free to use only part of savings (25%). Finally, NHs were probably
quite conservative in reorganizing work - including the reduction of working time
or increased work intensity - that would have improved cost e¢ ciency.
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Still, concerns arise as to whether some cost savings were achieved through
a reduction of quality, i.e. the number and type of nurses. We observed that
the nursing sta¤ employed over the theoretical nursing sta¤ dened by the reg-
ulator slightly decreased after the implementation of the new payment system.
Nevertheless, we did not nd evidence of a similar drop in the professional nurse-
to-patient ratio and the ratio of professional to total nursing sta¤. Therefore,
PPS seems to have attained mild improvements on costs without a remarkable
decrease in quality. Likely, the tight Swiss regulation was successful in avoiding
negative e¤ects on quality after the introduction of PPS.
One shortcoming of this work is that more time may be necessary to observe
the full e¤ects of the prospective global budget. Our data covered a span of
ve years after the introduction of the new regime. Also, our ndings rely on
the assumption that changes in costs over time are attributable only to the new
payment system. Clearly, it is not possible to totally exclude that other factors
played a role. We provided evidence of the strength of our identication strategy
by considering the main economic and political changes that could potentially
impact on costs. We are encouraged by the observed stability of nursing home
care demand over time and the tight quality regulation.
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Appendix
Average costs per resident-day in pilot NHs are signicantly lower than in non-
pilot NHs in the period before the full implementation of the reform (Table 5).
In Table 6 we report the average costs of NHs in three di¤erent periods: the
period prior the pilot phase (2001  2002), the pilot phase (2003  2005), and the
period of full policy implementation (2006   2010). Average costs increased in
both groups between the rst and the second period, about CHF 20 (9:3%) for
pilot NHs and CHF 10 (4:2%) for non-pilot NHs. Average costs for non-pilot NHs
increased slightly also between the second and the third period (+0:8%), whereas
average costs for pilot NHs dropped by 2:5%. Since pilot NHs experienced a more
remarkable increase in costs between the rst period and the second period, the
subsequent decrease in costs suggests that they reacted more strongly to the new
payment system than non-pilot NHs.
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Model 2: Q2 and Q3 Model 3: Q2 and Q4 Model 4: Q2 and Q5
Coe¢ cients Estimates Std. Err. Estimates Std. Err. Estimates Std. Err.
Y 0.858 0.047 0.789 0.059 0.801 0.057
Pl 0.751
 0.021 0.758 0.031 0.765 0.030
Pk 0.096
 0.007 0.101 0.009 0.095 0.011
Q1 0.244
 0.051 0.271 0.060 0.236 0.052
Q2 0.477
 0.038 0.493 0.057 0.490 0.060
Qi i=f3;4;5g 0.020 0.019 0.006 0.026 -0.016 0.062
Y Y 0.452 0.107 0.390 0.145 0.339 0.128
PlPl -0.043 0.089 -0.204
 0.113 -0.175 0.115
PkPk 0.103
 0.022 0.078 0.028 0.087 0.026
Q1Q1 0.148 0.125 -0.039 0.135 0.058 0.111
Q2Q2 0.372 0.384 0.262 0.479 0.424 0.475
QiQi i=f3;4;5g 0.102
 0.035 0.031 0.047 -0.032 0.149
Y Pl 0.128
 0.046 0.031 0.059 0.010 0.064
Y Pk 0.004 0.027 0.003 0.032 0.014 0.032
Y Q1 -0.032 0.143 0.210 0.127 0.234
 0.120
Y Q2 0.309
 0.150 0.260 0.147 0.283 0.148
Y Qi i=f3;4;5g -0.060
 0.035 -0.073 0.051 0.015 0.115
PlPk -0.065
 0.031 0.004 0.032 -0.009 0.052
PlQ1 0.281
 0.159 0.301 0.052 0.069 0.134
PlQ2 -0.207 0.241 -0.306 0.292 -0.162 0.288
PlQi i=f3;4;5g -0.062 0.078 -0.008 0.060 0.179 0.146
PkQ1 -0.136
 0.059 -0.045 0.106 -0.066 0.094
PkQ2 -0.074 0.071 0.002 0.098 -0.043 0.100
PkQi i=f3;4;5g 0.024 0.028 0.008 0.022 -0.056 0.047
Q1Q2 -0.014 0.380 -0.266 0.396 -0.167 0.419
Q1Qi i=f3;4;5g 0.038 0.081 0.075 0.063 0.014 0.181
Q2Qi i=f3;4;5g -0.134 0.115 -0.000 0.113 0.006 0.169
t 0.017 0.002 0.019 0.004 0.020 0.005
d 0.080 0.019 0.082 0.027 0.089 0.031
td -0.017 0.003 -0.018 0.005 -0.190 0.006
0 15.421 0.008 15.424 0.020 15.442
N 400 326 326
R2 0.972 0.973 0.972
Notes: Signicance levels: * = 10%, ** = 5%, *** =1%, **** = 0:1%:
Table 4: Results of the unrestricted xed-e¤ects models with two quality indica-
tors (Q2 and Q3, Q2 and Q4, Q2 and Q5).
Group Mean costs Std. dev. t-statistic
(2001-2005) on mean di¤erence
Pilot (N=20) 232.81 27.23 1.97
Non pilot (N=195) 244.67 25.44
Notes: All monetary values are in 2005 Swiss francs, adjusted by the national Consumer Price Index.
Table 5: Average costs comparison between pilot and non-pilot NHs for the whole
period.
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2001-2002  2003-2005  2006-2010
(1) (2)-(1) (2) (3)-(2) (3)
Pilot NHs 220.51 20.50 241.01 -6.01 235.00
(N=8) 9.3% (N=12) -2.5% (N=20)
Non pilot NHs 238.41 10.08 248.49 1.97 250.46
(N=74) 4.2% (N=121) 0.8% (N=205)
Notes: All monetary values are in 2005 Swiss francs, adjusted by the national Consumer Price Index.
Table 6: Average costs comparison between pilot and non-pilot NHs in di¤erent
periods.
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